From: "Alan Allen" Sent: Sunday, June 15, 2003 12:15 PM Subject: Task Force Miracle (Tet Offensive, 1968) Brad: I've got a tiny homepage that has some photos of my Vietnam days. I think you should be able to click-and-drag them onto your computer if you wish. AA Here's the article from Johnston's website, and I'll try to send you one that appeared in Stars And Stripes, an Army tabloid, and maybe one other one. AA ============================ I thought you might be interested in an article by a former Army lieutenant, Wayne Johnston, who went to Vietnam after I did, but who was in the same brigade. He's been nice enough to research some of the things that happened during the time I was there--1967-68, the years we lost the most men in Vietnam. Over 16,000 died in 1968, the year I got wounded the third time. In 1967 and 1969 we lost over 11,000 each year. The next closest year was 1970, and we lost over 6,000. His article is about Task Force Miracle, and includes info about one of the worst battles I was in, an ambush in a rice paddy at the village of Lo Giang, southwest of Da Nang. Don't read it if you don't want to. It won't hurt my feelings a bit. To see a few photos of some guys I was with, go to http://hometown.aol.com/ (the home page for the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry) and click on "photos" (top of page) then click on "albums" (left side page, I think), then click on "Kaiser" (left side page). The photos should be there. My Co. A had about 100 guys in the paddy, and in a very short time we had 19 dead and 34 wounded. Other companies in our 198th Light Infantry Brigade were shot up too, and our Co. A and a couple of other companies in the 198th ended up being awarded the Army's Valorous Unit Award for Lo Giang and the fighting we did in the few days following. I knew Lo Giang had vicious fighting, but I was somewhat astonished at Johnston's comment at the end of his article, to wit:
"Note: as a historical comparison, the loss of 34 KIA
in only a few hours
by a battalion sized unit is a tragedy comparable to
the 36 KIA suffered
by the 3rd Bn 187th Inf, 101st Abn Div, in ten days of
combat at the
infamous battle for "Hamburger Hill" (Dong Ap Bia)
during 10-20 May 1969.
Other Army and Marine units also suffered greatly
during the Vietnam war,
but the ferocity at Lo Giang was seldom matched." (Johnston's webpages at www.hometown.aol.com/old16inf/ have other info on Co. A, including some on Sgt. Finnis McCleery, my old platoon sargeant, who won the Congressional Medal of Honor on Hill 352, west of Tam Ky, on 5/ 14/68.) AA -------------------- Here is Johnston's article: Tet 1968: Task Force Miracle... The Battle for Lo Giang and CAP Echo 4 This account of the battle was prepared by Wayne R. Johnston based on the following information: The 1st Bn 6th Inf Combat Action Report (Battle for Lo Giang) dated 23 February 1968 found at the USAIS Library, Ft. Benning GA; oral accounts by several survivors of the battle; an audio tape made in February 1968 by CPT Francis X. Brennan while he was recuperating from wounds; Mike Readinger's story of CAP Echo 4; the USMC publication US Marines in Vietnam, the Defining Year 1968, and the 198th Inf Bde Memorial Ceremony program (provided by Alan Allen, A/1-6 1967-68). Background Information. In January 1968, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV) totaled nearly 500,000 and had taken over much of the large scale unit warfare from the South Vietnamese. III MAF controlled allied military forces in the I Corps area of northern South Vietnam. The US 1st Marine Division and 51st ARVN Regiment provided protection for the Da Nang area. Enemy forces in the northern I Corps area were controlled directly by the North Vietnamese. III MAF, the US Marine command in I Corps, emphasized the small unit war in the villages. Consequently they developed the Combined Action Program (CAP) that assigned a squad of US Marines to a village Vietnamese Popular Forces platoon. One of these units, CAP Echo 4, was located in the village of Lo Giang (1) several miles south of Da Nang. The objective of these and similar units was to create a bond with the local village population that would sever their relationship with the guerrillas and VC infrastructure. While the Marines emphasized these small unit relations, the MACV forces were directed at defeating the enemy's main forces. The battle for Lo Giang conducted by the US Army soldiers from the 1st Battalion 6th Infantry and the attempted relief and eventual extraction of the Marines at CAP Echo 4 demonstrated the relationship between these two very different approaches to the war. The 1968 TET Offensive begins. On 27 Jan 68, the Communists announced their seven-day cease fire for Tet 1968. Several days later, however, they launched the largest offensive of the war. Attacks began in the Da Nang area on 30 Jan 68. At 0230 sappers attacked the III MAF compound in Da Nang. About one hour later, enemy forces attacked the I Corps headquarters complex in Hoa Vang.
An extract from the official US Marine Corps history
shows the following:
"Under cover of darkness, elements of the VC R-20th
and V-25th Battalions
had crossed the Cau Do River. With covering fire
provided by 81mm and
82mm mortars, about a reinforced company reached the I
Corps headquarters
compound actually located within the city of Da Nang
just outside the
northern perimeter of the main airbase. The fighting
within the compound
continued until daylight. After 2. their breaching of
the outer defenses,
the enemy squad fired B-40 rockets at the headquarters
building, but then
fought a delaying action, waiting for reinforcements.
These reinforcements never came. The bulk of the enemy
attack force
remained in Hoa Vang Village bogged down in a
firefight with local PF and
Regional Force troops reinforced by a Combined Action
platoon, E-3."
"At Da Nang, on the 30th, the fighting did not subside
with the coming of
daylight. Elements of the VC R-20th and local force
units which
participated in the attack on Hoa Vang and I Corps
headquarters attempted
to escape the dragnet of Marine and ARVN forces. While
the 1st MP
Battalion supported by the 1st Tank Battalion
established blocking
positions north of the Cau Do River, the ARVN 3d
Battalion, 51st Regiment
swept the sector south of the river. Caught east of
the Cam La Bridge and
Route l, on a small island formed by the convergence
of the Cau Do, a
small tributary of the river, and the Vien Dien River,
the VC turned to
fight.
A Combined Action platoon at 0830 saw a number of VC
attempting to swim
across the Cau Do to the island."
In the fighting that followed, the 3rd Battalion , 5th
Marines and ARVN
force managed to kill 102 NVA and VC by use of
artillery and tactical air
strikes in the vicinity of Lo Giang (2) on 30 Jan 68.
Many of the enemy
were killed as they attempted to cross the Cau Do
River.
[PHOTO: Looking south at the ferry crossing vic BT
033733 on the Cau Do
River east of Hoa Vang, approximately 2 km. southeast
of the Da Nang
airfield. This 1968 photo was taken by Mike "Tiny"
Readinger (CAP Echo 2
and HQ) several months before the TET offensive and is
almost a shot of
the exact path taken by the NVA. The village of Lo
Giang and CAP Echo 4
were located about 2 km south of the river.]
On 31 Jan 68, Communist forces launched major attacks
in 39 province
capitals throughout the country, and in Saigon and
Hue. On the night of
2-3 Feb 68, twenty-eight 122mm rockets fell on Da
Nang. Elsewhere in I
Corps, ground attacks on the Marine garrison at Khe
Sanh began on 5 Feb 68.
On 7 Feb 68, the daring and successful attack by NVA
forces at the Lang
Vei Special Forces camp west of Khe Sanh captured
world wide media
attention.
That attack featured the use of NVA PT 76 light
armored tanks. The
Marines at Khe Sanh refused to come to the aid of US
Special Forces
soldiers who were being overrun by the enemy armor.
On 7 Feb 68, the MACV commander, General Westmoreland,
called for a
meeting with the III MAF commander, General Cushman.
Concerned that III
MAF had not reacted properly to the Lang Vei episode
and that inadequate
precautions had been taken to defend Da Nang, General
Westmoreland ordered
the Americal Division to supply several infantry
battalions to bolster the
defenses south of Da Nang.
3.
III MAF planners decided to utilize a two-battalion
Army task force in the
northern sector of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines near
highway QL1 just south
of the Cau Do River.
Task Force Miracle, as the force came to be named, was
formed by the 1st
Bn 6th Inf (198th Lt Inf Bde) and 2nd Bn 1st Inf
(196th Lt Inf Bde) from
the Americal Division.
The 1st Battalion 6th Infnatry, 198th Light Infantry
Brigade, Americal
Division moves north.
At 1515 hours on 7 Feb 68, the 1st Bn 6th Inf was
ordered to provide two
infantry companies and a command element as soon as
possible to III MAF in
Da Nang. Alpha Company, 1st Bn, 6th Inf (A/1-6)
previously had been
designated as the "sixty minute alert company," tasked
with reinforcing
units elsewhere in Vietnam. By 1630 hours they were at
LZ Gator south of
Chu Lai and ready to move to Da Nang. At 1735 the 131
men of Alpha
company under the command of CPT Francis X. Brennan
arrived at LZ 410,
located at AT 991678.
They were greeted by the commander of the marine unit
at that location who
was under the operational control of the 1st Marine
Division. The move
had happened so rapidly that "their presence left [the
commander and staff
of LZ 410] at a loss." Only sketchy information about
enemy activity was
available. The 1st Bn 6th Inf commander, LTC William
J. Baxley Jr.
evaluated the situation and ordered his two available
infantry companies
to move into locations just south of the Cau Do River.
A/1-6 received their orders and moved out at 2200
hours. By 080155 Feb 68
they had arrived at their night defensive position
(NDP) BT 022714
approximately 400 m. East of the Cam Le Bridge.
The 128 men of Co. C. 1st Bn 6th Inf (C/1-6) under CPT
Max D. Bradley were
only hours behind, and closed on their NDP at BT
005694 by 080215 Feb 68.
The plan was for both companies to move from their
NDPs to the bridge at
BT 025719 and then to conduct search and destroy
missions on the island
formed by the Cau Do, a tributary of the river, and
the Vien Dien River
with center of mass for the operations at BT 035725.
[PHOTO: View of the Da Nang airfield and base complex
looking northward
across the Cau Do River. Highway QL1 is visible as it
approaches the Cam
Le Bridge at the left of the photo. The island in the
Cau Do River
near the center of the photo provided a fording site
for the VC during
their attack on 30 Jan 68. The tree line just visible
along the extreme
bottom edge of the photo directly below the Cam Le
Bridge concealed large
numbers of NVA troops as A/1-6 Inf moved south across
the rice paddy area
toward Lo Giang village on 8 Feb 68. This photo, taken
from about 4,000
ft almost directly above Lo Giang, was provided by
Mike Readinger.]
The Battle for Lo Giang and CAP Echo 4.
4.
Enemy activity began anew early the morning of 8 Feb
68. At 0345 hours,
enemy mortar rounds fell into the CAP Echo 4 compound
vic BT 028704 near
Lo Giang. By daylight, enemy ground forces surrounded
the marines in the
CAP hamlet. At 0602 hours, the 14 men at the location
under the command
of SGT B. Keith Cossey received heavy small arms fire
from BT 027699. Four
NVA killed in the action were found to be armed with
CS grenades. All
friendly units in the area were alerted of the enemy
gas attack
capabilities.
The defenders at CAP Echo 4 had expended most of their
ammunition, but
rearmed themselves with enemy weapons and ammunition.
In view of the
attack on the Marines, C/1-6 was ordered to move from
its NDP and to
advance on Lo Giang village at BT 025725.
As daylight arrived over the area, a OV-1 "bird dog"
aircraft detected
approximately 400 persons on the ground in the
vicinity of Lo Giang. The
aerial observer could not determine whether the
soldiers were enemy or
friendly before they disappeared under the canopy of
trees in the
area. Such brazen daylight moves by large enemy forces
were a rarity.
The information about the large number of suspected
enemy soldiers was not
communicated to the 1st Bn 6th Inf soldiers in the
vicinity of Lo Giang.
Because of the size of the attack against CAP Echo 4,
Marines from
adjacent CAP units and the CAP headquarters north of
the Cao Do formed a
reaction force under CPT Howard L. Joselane to come to
their aid. One of
the Marine volunteers in the force, SGT Dennis W.
Hammond, had less than
three weeks to go before returning to the States, but
stated that this was
his "last chance" to accomplish something. The relief
force was taken by
truck across the Cam Le Bridge and south on QL1 to the
vic BT 016698 where
they started toward Echo 4.
At 0826 hours, A/1-6 received small arms fire from BT
026705. They
observed large numbers of civilians fleeing to the
northeast from Lo Giang
village. Having received the proper clearance, they
began firing 81mm
mortar rounds into the outskirts of the village.
As C/1-6 crossed highway QL1 near BT 016698 at 0940
hours, they received
automatic weapons from enemy soldiers located in the
pagoda at BT 022724
that increased in intensity as they advanced.
As the CAP relief force under CPT Joselane that had
been attempting to
reinforce CAP Echo 4 approached the tree line on the
west end of Lo Giang,
they suddenly came under intense fire at close
range. Shortly after the
attack began, they were overwhelmed by large numbers
of VC and NVA. They
radioed for help and then a short time later announced
that they were
being overrun. Capt Joselane's last words over the
radio were "they're all
over us....no way out. Don't send anyone else in
here...tell my wife I
love her." Thirteen marines in the relief force were
killed by the enemy.
Some of the Marines were bayoneted as they lay
wounded.
Three Marines, including SGT Hammond, were captured by
the NVA as POWs,
but 5. one later managed to escape. Hammond later died
in captivity. One
Marine, although badly wounded, miracleously survived
due to the
magnanimity of a NVA radio operator who spared his
life. The Marine had
befriended the NVA soldier earlier while on a CAP
mission. The NVA soldier
had pretended to be a Vietnamese peasant who needed
food and medical
attention.
[NOTE: The harrowing nature of the ordeal suffered by
the Marines in the
relief force and their incredible bravery has been
spelled out in detail
in an excellent story prepared by Mike "Tiny"
Readinger that can be found
on the Marine CAP web site. Those few brave Marines in
the aborted relief
effort did not stand a chance against a numerically
superior NVA force
that would practically overrun two platoons of A
Co/1-6 Inf only a short
time later. Their efforts, however, provided hope to
the beleaguered CAP
defenders and forced the NVA to shift their attention
away from CAP Echo 4.]
In the meantime, C/1-6 was pinned down in the rice
paddy area northwest of
Lo Giang. By 1015 two soldiers were wounded, and four
more were wounded
at 1100 hours. All six soldiers were dusted off by
Marine helicopters,
and the accompanying gun ships remained to provided
additional fire
support. Marine gunships and intense return fire from
C/1-6 blunted the
enemy efforts.
The NVA next concentrated their fire on A/1-6 on the
north side of Lo
Giang. At 1132 hours, those soldiers began receiving
heavy automatic
weapons fire from BT 025706.
Meanwhile, the enemy attack on CAP Echo 4 continued in
earnest. The
marines in the small fortified position near the
village of Lo Giang (1)
reported that they were under heavy attack by large
numbers of NVA
soldiers. Although badly outnumbered, the CAP Echo 4
defenders were
fortified with bunkers and wire entanglements.
[PHOTO from 1968 of the southern portion of the
perimeter at CAP Echo 4
provided by Mike "Tiny" Readinger, who was at the CAP
Echo headquarters as
an RTO during the battle. His story on the CAP web
site contains detailed
information about the incredible difficulties faced by
the CAP Marines.]
Because of the intense automatic weapons fire and
mortar rounds from the
enemy that inflicted many casualties, C/1-6 was unable
to advance toward
Lo Giang.
In the meantime, Company B, 1st Bn 6th Inf, under the
command of CPT Dan A.
Prather, had been flown north from LZ Gator near Chu
Lai and had arrived
south of Da Nang at LZ 410 at 1050 hours. At 1132
hours they were ordered
to move by truck to BT 015695 and to link up with the
Marines under attack
at CAP Echo 4.
Company G, 2nd Bn 3rd Marines, from LZ 410, was on the
right flank of
B/1-6 Inf as they moved toward CAP Echo 4. The Marines
killed 7 NVA as
they advanced.
At 081510 Feb however, they were released to their
parent unit and moved
to the east of the Vinh Diem River to search for a
reported 1,000 man NVA
force. (The 6. next day Companies G and F of 2nd Bn
3rd Marines killed 107
NVA at BT 031698).
Approximately 1500 meters to the northeast, the combat
action near A/1-6
was increasing. A/1-6 reported receiving additional
automatic weapons
fire at 1136 hours. Mortar fire from 4th platoon into
the village paid off
with secondary explosions. At 1233 hours,CPT Brennan
decided to "check
out the village" and told his forward observer to have
a fire mission
"laid on the village" as they prepared to attack. In
an audio tape he
prepared in Feb 68, CPT Brennan described the action
in his own words:
"I put two of my rifle platoons on a skirmish line,
followed by the CP
group centered on the two platoons and a platoon held
in reserve trailing
the CP group by 100 meters. ...The two platoons on
line covered a width of
approximately 200 meters. The configuration was 2nd
Platoon on the left
(East) side and 3rd Platoon on the right (West) side
and the 1st Platoon
trailing in reserve. The weapons (4th) platoon went
into action [from the
cover of the NDP position in the graveyard at BT
023710]."
The terrain to the front of A/1-6 was flat and was
covered by rice crops
about one-foot tall. To their front and along a
northeast-southwest line
running from BT 029708 to a pagoda at BT 021704 was a
tree line. It was
along this tree line that the enemy was thought to be
deployed.
Unknown to them the NVA had low-crawled out into the
paddy about 100
meters north of the treeline and spread out,
paralleling the trees along a
small dirt berm that, along with the rice, and the
banana leaves strapped
to their backs, helped obscure them.
[PHOTO by Mike "Tiny" Readinger probably was taken in
late December 1967,
looking northeast toward the village of Lo Giang. The
structure visible on
the right edge of the photo is believed to be the
pagoda in the vic BT
021704 that sheltered enemy troops as they fired on
C/1-6 as they
attempted to advance toward Lo Giang. Soldiers from
A/1-6 Inf advanced
from the trees on the left behind the sign and crossed
the rice fields in
the distance toward the far side (i.e. north side) of
the tree line
visible on the right side of photo. Enemy mortars near
the pagoda shelled
them in the open as the attempted to advance across
the area. Marble
Mountain is in the distance. CAP Echo 4 is located
down the path to the
right about 800m through the village. The bodies of
the valiant Marine
relief force were found to the right of this photo,
just short of the tree
line].
As the soldiers of A/1-6 Inf neared the berm they
suddenly came under a
tremendous volume of enemy rocket, machine gun, RPG,
grenade, and rifle
fire from immediately in front, as well as motar fire.
A furious fight
developed as the NVA enemy charged over the berm. The
officers and men of
A/1-6 later reported that the enemy leaders were
easily identifiable as
they were moving behind groups of seven to ten men
using hand and arm
signals to direct their units.
In CPT Brennan's words:
"A Company was flanked on both sides by at least an
NVA company on each 7.
side and was sustaining a frontal assault by another
NVA company. The
enemy assault element was on line, advancing in a
crouched firing position
from the northwest woodline at the village. The flank
enemy elements were
attempting to link up at our rear, thus encircling
[the unit]."
In a matter of seconds A Co. and two companies of a
unit positively
identified as the 60th Main Force Viet Cong Battalion
(60% to 70% NVA
soldiers), First NVA Regiment 2nd NVA Division with
the 370th Hqs Company,
were in a hand to hand battle in the rice paddies
immediately northwest
of Lo Giang. During the initial heavy contact, A Co.
killed 78 NVA
soldiers and suffered 10 KHA and 22 WHA.
The second platoon leader, 2LT Bowman, was killed in
the fight, but
subsequently received the nation's second highest
decoration for
valor--the Distinguished Service Cross. At one point,
CPT Brennan received
a call from the second platoon radio telephone
operator (RTO) who thought
2LT Bowman was dead:
"The second platoon RTO called in a state of near
panic. He said the
enemy were crawling directly to his rear and each
flank."
CPT Brennan observed that "The proximity of the enemy
fire was
approximately ten to twenty meters at times. The enemy
was attempting to
intermingle with my troops having cut off our route of
withdrawal." He
concluded that the "only hope left for the company was
to pull back to the
mortar position and to reorganize."
At 1415 hours, eight sorties of tactical air support
arrived from the 1st
Marine Air Wing. The bombs and other mixed ordnance
blunted the
continuing NVA attack. After the air strikes, the NVA
resumed their
assault, but the defenses of A/1-6 held.
Seventy four additional NVA were killed in the open.
At 1500 hours, CPT
Brennan was wounded, along with his two RTOs. Both
radios were destroyed
and communications were lost with battalion
headquarters.
Not all the combat action had been confined to A/1-6.
C/1-6 continued to
be attacked. At 1320 hours they came under heavy
automatic weapons fire,
and at 1530 hours were subjected to an intense mortar
attack at BT 018698.
By late afternoon they had suffered 2 KIA and 28 WHA
(including all
officers) as they attacked toward Lo Giang.
Company B, 1st Bn 6th Inf also ran into significant
enemy resistance. As
they tried to move toward the CAP Echo 4 location at
1450 hours, they came
under small arms fire at BT 022694. At 1532 hours they
were subjected to a
heavy enemy mortar barrage. By 1615 hours they finally
located the enemy
mortar position, and pounded it with their own
mortars. They attacked and
overran the enemy mortar position at BT023697 and
killed 30 NVA at a loss
of only 2 soldiers WHA.
Fortunately, the marines at CAP Echo 4 did not have to
wait on the arrival
of B/1-6 Inf. According to the official Marine
historical accounts, they
had managed "to hold out against overwhelming odds."
At 1550 hours they
were extracted by
air.
At 1615 hours, radio contact was reestablished with
A/1-6. The soldiers
had consolidated their position in the cover of the
cemetery at BT 022713.
Nineteen of the approximately 66 in 2nd and 3rd
platoons had been killed,
and another 35 wounded. 1st platoon, held on a
skirmish line 100 meters
to the rear, and the weapons platoon, shooting mortars
from the cemetary,
were relatively unscathed.
Because of their reduced strength. Co E, 1st Bn 6th
Inf was ordered to
move from LZ 410 to help consolidate their defenses
with A/1-6 Inf at BT
022712. Co C also moved into their position at BT
014697. The confirmed
enemy body count at that time: A - 207; B - 37; C-14;
G - 8. Ninety
percent of the enemy had full web gear, including
combat packs. Over 100
enemy weapons were counted by A Co alone.
It should be noted that until 081430 Feb 68 the 1st Bn
6th Inf commander
did not have a command and control (C&C) helicopter at
his disposal. When
it finally arrived it was used for two hours for
medivac and resupply.
A/1-6 had 28 WIA and C/1-6 had 17 WIA.
The C&C helicopter pilots were WO1 Edward A.
Fitzsimmons and 1LT David R.
Ewing of the "Minutemen", 176th Assault Helicopter
Company. They flew 21
sorties into the battlefield, evacuated 31 wounded,
and resupplied all
companies. To quote the official After Action Report
"without the courage
and skill of Mr. Fitzsimmons and LT Ewing it is
doubtful if all the
wounded would have been evacuated prior to darkness on
the night of 8 Feb
1968."
The aftermath.
From 082011 to 090705 Feb 68, all elements of 1st Bn
6th Inf reported no
nighttime enemy activity on the battlefield.
Unfortunately this was not
true for the lone remaining survivor of the CAP 4
relief force. He was
searched, and kicked several times while he played
dead from his multiple
wounds. He was discovered alive the next morning by
Marines from the CAPs
near Hoa Vang.
[MAP: Red numbers on the map show approximate
locations where NVA
equipment, supplies, and bodies were found.]
The next morning Co A and E began conducting a sweep
of the Lo Giang area.
While moving through the battlefield Co E/1-6 Inf
continually reported
evidence of blood trails and paths through the rice
where the NVA dragged
away their dead and wounded.
1 Near a pagoda at BT 022704 Co A/1-6 found 43 NVA
bodies with web gear
and packs that had not previously been counted.
2 At the same location they found 52 Chicom grenades,
1500 rounds of
ammunition, and the two damaged PRC-25 radios that had
captured from A/1-6
9. the previous day. Co A/1-6 had pounded the area
near the pagoda with
mortar and automatic weapons fire the previous
afternoon.
[PHOTP:1968, of the path leading through Lo Giang to
CAP Echo 4 provided
by Mike "Tiny" Readinger (CAP Echo 1968)
[readincm@earthlink.net] The
dense vegetation in and around Lo Giang and CAP Echo 4
provided ample
concealment for the NVA as shown in the photo above.
Search and destroy
sweeps by 1-6 Inf troops after the battle revealed
that large numbers of
NVA troops had occupied practically every portion of
the cover.]
At 0930 hours C/1-6 Inf found three LAWs, one M60 MG
and a box of
documents at BT 022688.4 At the same time, B/1-6
found a missing soldier
from C Co and the remains of another MIA. 5
At BT 025706 Company A and E/1-6 found two large piles
of mixed NVA and
American equipment. The piles were approximately four
feet high and twelve
feet in diameter.6 Most of the equipment was NVA. At
1210 hours, C/1-6
Inf found the bodies of seven NVA soldiers with web
gear and green
uniforms from the 370th Hqs Co of the 1st NVA
Regiment.
At 1025 E/1-6 reported from Lo Giang that they found
the remains of four
soldiers from A/1-6 who had been reported as MIA the
previous day.7
At 1230 hours, B/1-6 found the bodies of four NVA
soldiers from the 60th
Bn, 1st NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division at BT 027699.8
At 1435 E/1-6
located 1 M-1 rifle, two M-1 carbines, one RPG MG, 50
Chicom grenades,
several sets of NVA web gear, and one NVA gas mask at
BT 025705. It was
obvious that the enemy had been soundly defeated as it
was unlike the NVA
or VC to abandon bodies, weapons, and equipment on
the battlefield.
The 1st Bn 6th Inf units continued to search the
battlefield for signs of
the enemy on 10 and 11 Feb 68.
At 100828 Feb 68, Co C/1-6 found eight NVA bodies
soldiers with an AK47
rifle at BT 030706.9 One of the bodies, thought to be
Chinese, was
determined by MI personnel and a medical team to be
ethnic Noung.
Cos E and A/1-6 moved into the Then Khue village area
after CH47 aircraft
came under fire from that area. They found two LAWs
(light antitank
weapons), one expended, at BT 035716. 10 Co C/1-6
found nine additional
NVA bodies in brown uniforms with web gear and AK-47
magazines in the
vicinity of BT 026703.11
By the evening of 10 Feb 68, it was evident that the
TF Miracle area of
operations was cleared of NVA and Main Force VC
forces. Nevertheless,
significant discoveries of weapons and ammunition
continued.
At 111100 Feb 68, C/1-6 found four prepared mortar
position and four 82mm
mortar rounds in the hamlet of Co Man at BT 025687
that had been used to
mortar 10. A Co during the battle for Lo Giang.12
Thirty minutes later
they found a 4'x4' box of green uniforms, a brief case
full of documents,
and a trench system with fire lanes and fighting
positions. 13
E/1-6 found two RPG MG, flares, 24 Chicom grenades,
NVA pistol belts,
canteens and a gas mask near BT 022709. 14
At BT 025694 C/1-6 found 29 Chicom grenades, 8 RPG
rockets with boosters,
1
AK47 rifle with 4 magazines, and one Winchester 12 ga.
shotgun. 15
At 111145 Feb 68, A/1-6 found a huge amount of
ammunition on the eastern
side of the Lo Giang hamlet. 16 This included 240 60mm
mortar rounds, 48
M-26 grenades, 576 12 ga. shotgun shells, 50 claymore
mines, 3,500 rounds
of .45 cal. ammo, 847 cal 30 rounds, 2,000 rounds of
AK-47 ammo and 200
Chicom grenades.
Although vast quantities of enemy weapons, ammunition
and equipment were
discovered in the days after the battle for Lo Giang,
saturation
patrolling located few live enemy soldiers. Ninety
enemy bodies were found
at BT 044704 by Marine patrols. The absence of any
signs of fighting at
the location indicated that the 60th Main Force VC
Battalion had retreated
to the east with their deadand wounded.
On 12 Feb 16, the 1st Bn 6th Inf had completed its
mission as part of Task
Force Miracle in the defense of Da Nang. That effort
had been costly, as
the 1st Bn 6th Inf lost 22 soldiers killed and 68
wounded in action. The
Marine relief force lost 12 killed, three captured as
POWs 9one later
escaped while, the other 2 died in captivity), 1
wounded, and only 1
escaped back to CAP Echo 2.
[Note: as a historical comparison, the loss of 34 KIA
in only a few hours
by a battalion sized unit is a tragedy comparable to
the 36 KIA suffered
by the 3rd Bn 187th Inf, 101st Abn Div, in ten days of
combat at the
infamous battle for "Hamburger Hill" (Dong Ap Bia)
during 10-20 May 1969.
Other Army and Marine units also suffered greatly
during the Vietnam war,
but the ferocity at Lo Giang was seldom matched.]
At the end of the mission, the 1st Bn 6th Inf was
extracted from the area
and moved south to LZ Baldy, where they were place
under the operational
control of the 3rd Bde, 4th Infantry Division to
participate in Operation
Wheeler/Wallowa. In that operation Sgt. Finnis
McCleery of San Angelo,
Texas won the Congressional Medal of Honor on May 14,
1968, at Hill 352.
MEMORIAL: A memorial service was conducted in Vietnam
by the 198th
Infantry Brigade on 21 Sep 68 to honor those soldiers
who had been killed
during the first year (not just at Lo Giang) the unit
served in Vietnam.
Some of those killed include:
2LT Joseph B. Bowman, SGT Robert N. Carter, SP4 James
S. Cerione, SP4
Ralph A. Dahm, PFC Amos H. Boutwell, PFC Robert L.
Dykes, Jr., PFC John I.
Haselbauer, PFC Brian F. Durr, PSG John R. Poso, SGT
David L. McKinney,
SP4 Denton A. Carrasquillo, SP4 George R. Denslow, SP4
Lanny E. Hale, SP4
Rodney P. Troyer, SP4 John L. Jervis III, PFC Walter
R. Pratt, SSG Ramon H.
Gonzales, SP4 James L. Lopp, SP4 James E. Parker,
SP4 John A. Wilcox, SP4
Michael Pumillo, PFC Franklin Clovis, PFC Charles E.
Hodge |